How GasFreeNYC Won a Gas Ban in New York City

This article presents a case study of the #GasFreeNYC campaign, a coalition of four grassroots organizations that fought for and won a gas ban in all new buildings in New York City in just 10 months, from March to December 2021.

This case study provides an interesting example of a coalition that was centred around a concrete goal, that identified specific targets, and that leveraged key constituencies to influence those targets. This makes it a worthwhile campaign for organizers and activists to better understand.

The information in this article is drawn mostly from a write-up by one of the campaign organizers, available here. Page citations in the text refer to this document.

Campaign breakdown

The coalition consisted of the following 4 groups:

1. New York Communities for Change (NYCC), based in Black and Latinx communities in New York City and on Long Island
2. New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), based in communities of colour at CUNY college campuses
3. WE ACT for Environmental Justice, based in communities of colour in Upper Manhattan and the Bronx
4. Food & Water Watch, described as prioritizing a grassroots base

The coalition was designed to be “accountable to a multiracial base,” and fundraised just over $200,000 over the course of the year to run the campaign.

The article identifies 4 key political actors in the City government:

1. Mayor Bill de Blasio, who spoke in favour of a gas ban in January 2021
2. Council Speaker Corey Johnson, the main target of the campaign
3. Councilmember Alicka Ampry-Samuel, a Democrat from central Brooklyn and the prime sponsor of the bill
4. Environmental Committee Chair Jim Gennaro, whose committee controlled the public hearing process for the bill

The coalition made a number of key strategic and organizational decisions, which can be considered as internal factors that contributed to the campaign’s success:

1. Coalition: the coalition was based on organizations with a grassroots base, especially in communities of colour. This helped the coalition to avoid being portrayed as out of touch in its demand for a gas ban.
   1. The coalition was led by housing and justice groups based in communities of colour, who emphasized jobs and pollution cuts as well as climate action (2).
   2. Each group agreed to mobilize their bases, committing to bringing out 10-15 for every action (1-2).
2. Messaging: the messaging was targeted to mobilize activists and challenge public officials.
   1. Challenging public officials: “Our groups were unafraid to press specific and powerful elected officials in public. In contrast, too many groups run “low-threat” campaigns that elected officials know they can dismiss at little or no cost because there is no “or else” beyond a press release expressing “disappointment”. In contrast, a mobilized and real grassroots constituency is automatically a threat” (1).
   2. Gas ban vs. electrification: the coalition chose not to frame the campaign in the more conciliatory terms of ‘electrification’, but rather in the more combative terms of a ‘gas ban’. Why? First, they needed to motivate potential activists, and they knew that they could rally activists by tapping into the local history of movements against fossil fuels. Second, from the experience of successful gas ban campaigns on the West Coast, they knew that the gas and real estate industry would call the bill a gas ban anyway, so they decided to lean into that messaging and flip the script on their opponents.
   3. ‘Keeping it real’: Rather than citing academic studies to answer questions about affordability, the campaign pointed to examples of New York City developers already constructing fossil-free buildings. They also did research to create a memo on five large building projects built without gas, and pointed to the lower utility bills in people’s apartments there.
3. Main target: Speaker Corey Johnson was the main target of the campaign. This is because in the context of the New York City Council, the Speaker of Council controls the process of a bill becoming a law.

This choice of target was also inspired by the experience of the campaign to pass Local Law 97, a law adopted in 2019 which “requires large buildings to cut their climate-heating pollution” (6). Organizers had won Speaker Johnson's support for the bill, and his support enabled its adoption, even in the face of strong opposition by the city's real estate industry.

There were also a number of external factors that contributed to the campaign’s success:

1. Supportive mayor: Mayor Bill de Blasio was independently in favour of a gas ban, and his staff pressed the City Council to pass the bill.
2. Supportive sponsor: prime sponsor Alicka Ampry-Samuel was very outspoken in her support for the bill:
   1. “Had Ampry-Samuel not been willing to work with us and instead had just kept her head down, the bill would never have been introduced, let alone enacted. That wouldn’t have been the first time a prime sponsor had effectively sunk their own bill with limp support.
   2. “Ampry-Samuel made the gas ban a priority with Johnson and internally within the Council. Moreover, she repeatedly cited the injustice of unequal air quality and other social and economic conditions between her district and wealthier, majority-white districts. As a Black woman representing a low/low-middle income Brooklyn district, she had greater credibility to make the case for the bill. Like the diverse #GasFreeNYC coalition, she couldn’t be easily painted as an out-of-touch elitist” (22).
3. Supportive Speaker: eventually, Speaker Corey Johnson came out in support of the bill:
   1. “Corey Johnson, the Council’s Speaker, was also a critical factor in this victory. As described above, he was open to action in this area. He’d pushed through the legislation that became Local Law 97, which was the culmination of a multi-year, winning grassroots campaign. Johnson could have stalled the bill. Other Speakers probably would have” (23).
4. Corporate divide: the two major utility providers were split on the issue. National Grid is a gas-only provider, and opposed the bill, but ConEd provides both gas and electric service, and implicitly favoured it.
5. Renewables market: the cost of new all-electric construction had dropped enough in recent years to undermine the argument that a gas ban would raise costs on the real estate industry.
6. Movement context: the example of other cities having already enacted a gas ban - starting with Berkeley, California in 2019 - gave the proposal credibility.

Timeline

January 28, 2021	In his State of the City address, Mayor Bill de Blasio announces New York City will ban fossil fuel connections in new construction by at least 2030.
March	The coalition organizes an educational training on the campaign and the issue. “The training had almost 100 people in virtual attendance and the campaign kickoff had over 100 people. These events were very successful because they were energetic and exciting, big (enough), and multiracial. Multiple Councilmembers joined us for both events, including the legislation’s champion, who soon became its prime sponsor, Alicka Ampry-Samuel” (7).
April	The #GasFreeNYC campaign is launched.
May	Intro 2317, the bill to ban gas in new buildings, is introduced in City Council. A bill on a gas ban had already been requested by Councilmember Alicka Ampry-Samuel (in the City Council you first have to request a bill), but it was not introduced by the Speaker until May after activists called the Speaker’s office over 100 times about the bill. “This was another point where a less-aggressive effort could have stalled: we could have spent months trying to persuade staffers to get the bill introduced. Instead, we started generating calls into Johnson’s office. That seems perfectly logical, but in fact many groups and unions would have avoided even a low-threat push like a call in campaign. While over 100 calls isn’t much in a city of almost 9 million, in fact it’s a huge number for a legislative issue. It’s a rare day when the Speaker’s office takes that many calls. The simple fact that the phone was ringing off the hook got the staff’s attention” (12).
June	Speaker Corey Johnson was campaigning to be elected as NYC’s Comptroller, so the coalition pressured him to pass the bill in the 6-8 weeks preceding the election. The author acknowledges that this was “an extremely aggressive strategy” because the bill was so new and didn’t have many co-sponsors at the time. Tactics included a 30-person photo-op, a 100-person rally outside the televised debate, and calling/texting Johnson’s staff. In the end, Johnson didn’t take up the demand, but did tell one campaigner that “we’ll get it done” (13). NYCC had endorsed Johnson’s opponent, but none of the other groups had an official position.
July-September	Coalition mobilizes five new groups to add co-sponsors to the bill, eventually reaching over 20 co-sponsors by mid-September. “We contacted, re-contacted, re-re-contacted, then contacted target Councilmembers a few more times. [...] We hit everyone, except those we knew would surely be opponents. [...] we trained and worked deeply with individual constituents throughout the city to lobby their representatives, including members of our organizations. Activists kept contacting and following up as constituents with their own Councilmembers” (14).
September	Coalition prepared a series of events, protests, and rallies, including: ‘Street lobby days’ to catch Councilmembers walking between Council buildings and advocate on the bill. This helped get more co-sponsors for the bill. An event outside a 44-story high gas-free building under construction in Brooklyn Commemoration outside City Hall for victims of Hurricane Ida, which struck New York in September
September-November	Momentum builds towards a public hearing, a crucial step in the legislative process. Councilmember Jim Gennaro, chair of the Council’s Environmental Committee, agreed to hold a hearing on November 17 Before the hearing, the coalition mobilized over 100 people and elected officials to attend an online event to rally support for bill at the hearing The coalition brought a large turnout from advocacy groups, industry professionals and practitioners, institutions, ordinary people, and the coalition organizations
December	The coalition negotiated with Council on the final details of the bill. Coalition had leverage because the Mayor and the prime sponsor wanted a deal. They also knew the bill would fail if the coalition (the main advocates for the bill) opposed it Councilmember Jim Gennaro effectively represented the real estate and fossil fuel industries and demanded loopholes to allow gas use to continue in new buildings To convince Gennaro, they ran ads online and in Queens local newspapers, and eventually Gennaro dropped his demands. Gennaro already had a reputation on environmental issues, and the author says he must have realized that his reputation would have been shattered if he killed the bill. But Gennaro did win a longer timeline for larger big buildings, which had until 2027 to be gas free. Intro 2317 was passed by Council on December 15, and signed into law by Mayor de Blasio on December 22.

Important note: At the end of the article the author mentions that this campaign took place with barely any media coverage: “Even if you were an extremely well-read New Yorker who kept up with current events through the newspapers and public radio, you’d have had no idea this campaign was happening or that the city was on the verge of this major action. Larger outlets just wouldn’t cover the campaign. Then, all of a sudden, blam, massive headlines when the deal was done and the bill passed” (27).

Key quotes

On multiracial coalitions	“On so many climate-focused campaigns, the events and activities are numerically dominated by white progressive climate activists. That’s who shows up if you just put together a climate campaign and invite people digitally. [...] But multiracial organizing is also a critical pragmatic strategy for climate action. It is not just the right thing to do. It is the smart thing to do. [...] To win big stuff, you need a politically powerful coalition that can bring pressure throughout enough of the city’s diverse communities to win. “From the jump, the #GasFreeNYC campaign wasn’t going to be an effort dominated by white-led groups, or for that matter, by groups led by staffers of color, but with no actual grassroots, community base. That’s not real accountability. Functionally, it would have likely doomed us to failure. Instead, the training, kickoff and events were truly multiracial. The campaign wasn’t just fronted by some carefully selected speakers of color. It was a crowd and base that was multiracial in its makeup. This was a real multi-racial coalition campaign that could exercise grassroots influence in a wide variety of neighborhoods and Council districts across the city” (7).
On choosing target	“We weren’t going to just call on “City Hall” or “The City” or some other impersonal entity to act. [...] If you don’t wield a giant checkbook to make huge campaign contributions and/or fund a big electoral intervention down the line, you have to hold a specific decision-maker accountable. [...] You have to name a name. You need to have a target with decision-making power to hold accountable for results” (4).
Keeping it real in messaging	“Citing the lower utility bills in a neighbor’s new fossil free building was irrefutable: no industry lobbyist could credibly argue that all-electric construction meant higher costs when we documented the real world evidence. We could and did offer to put a politician on the phone with people living in a fossil free building, who could show them their utility bills. No one ever took up the offer, but the point was made. We did not allow the corporate lobbyists to paint us as out of touch with reality” (15).
Negotiating the bill	“We made clear to the Speaker and Mayor’s staff that if the Council agreed to Gennaro’s demands, we would oppose the bill. In that case, the deal would have “blown up”: the Council would not have moved forward with a bill that our groups would have opposed. [...] Our threat to tank a too-weak bill was entirely credible. They knew that we were not faking it. This wasn’t rhetoric; we were fully prepared to take our case to the next Council and Mayor. We’d built this campaign and we were ready to re-build rather than set a bad precedent that would undermine the law and set a bad example for other localities” (25).